26/04/2025
Sưu tầm
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7 Years Without a LTI…
At 9:45PM CDT on April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon—an ultra-deepwater drilling rig owned and operated by Transocean and contracted by BP—was drilling in the Macondo Prospect about 41 miles southeast of the Louisiana coast when a catastrophic blowout occurred.
The explosion and fire killed 11 crew members, injured 17 others, and led to the rig’s sinking two days later.
The same blowout triggered the largest accidental marine oil spill in history, resulting in an environmental disaster that lasted nearly three months, releasing an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf.
Notably, Deepwater Horizon had been seen as a high-performing rig.
It had received the MMS’s SAFE award in 2008, and on the day of the incident, company leaders were on board celebrating seven years without a Lost Time Incident (LTI).
However, post-incident analyses revealed multiple missed warning signs, systemic breakdowns in safety processes, and a culture strained by cost and schedule pressures.
Takeaway #1:
Rewarding low incident rates can unintentionally reward silence.
When safety becomes a scoreboard, people stop reporting.
A culture that fixates on the absence of bad can drive fear, underreporting, and superficial compliance.
We must reward learning over appearance - and recognize that transparency is a far stronger indicator of “safe” than the absence of incidents.
Because, as Clive Lloyd reminds us:
You can’t fix a secret.
Takeaway #2:
It’s due time we started having real conversations about safety.
The next time someone shares with us that they’ve gone multiple years without a paper cut or ankle sprain in their operations, we need to lovingly and curiously gaze at them and ask:
“7 years. Really? Tell me how you do that…”
Just as we would if someone shared with us they’ve gone seven years without a bad night of sleep.
Seven years without a single argument in their marriage.
Seven years without missing an email.
“That’s fascinating. Tell me more…”
Takeaway #3:
Our systems are perfectly designed to get the results they get.
If serious incidents still occur despite JHAs, audits, training, and traditional compliance based practices and metrics, we must ask:
What assumptions are built into our systems?
During the design phase specifically, but consistently day-to-day.
If we want different outcomes, we must redesign the system.
The question then remains.
Just how much and what parts of the system need to be remade?
So we can reimagine safety, and write a better future for the worker…
